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SOCIAL SECURITY

What triggers the time period for applying for attorney's fees

under the EAJA in Social Security benefits cases?
by Jay E. Grenig

Donna H. Shalala, Secretary of Health
and Human Services,
V.

Richard H. Schaefer
(Docket No. 92-311)
Argument Date: March 31, 1993

ISSUE
In an action for judicial review of the denial of a claim
for Social Security disability benefits, the district court
reversed the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and remanded the case for further proceedings. The
Supreme Court is asked to determine whether the district
court's remand order was a final judgment that triggered the
30-day period for filing an application for attorney's fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
FACTS
In June 1986 Richard Schaefer filed an application for
disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act. After his application was denied at all levels of
the administrative appeals process, he sought judicial review.
In an order dated April 4, 1989, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Minnesota reversed the decision of the
Secretary for Health and Human Services and remanded the
case for further consideration in accordance with sentence
four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The order became "not appealable" 60 days later on June 3, 1989, when the Secretary did
not appeal the court's decision.
Following the remand, an administrative law judge in a
decision dated January 31, 1990, found the respondent disabled. That decision became final 60 days later. On July 18,
1990, Schaefer filed an application in the district court for
attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
The EAJA provides that a party seeking an award of fees
and other expenses must submit the fee application to the court
within 30 days of "final judgment" in the action. The fee
application must show that the party is the "prevailing party."
In an unreported opinion, the district court rejected the
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Secretary's argument that the fee application in this case was
untimely because it had not been filed within 30 days of June
3, 1989 (i.e., July 3, 1989). The court ruled that the timeliness issue was controlled by the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Welter v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1991), and that,
under Welter's analysis, no final judgment had been entered
and that Schaefer's application was timely.
Concluding that the United States was not substantially
justified in taking the position that Schaefer was not entitled
to Social Security benefits, the district court awarded
Schaefer $1,372.50 in attorney's fees and $120 in costs
under the EAJA. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, a panel of the Eighth Circuit upheld the
district court's decision, again in an unreported opinion.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Under the Social Security Act, a claimant dissatisfied
with the administrative decision of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services on a claim for benefits may seek district
court review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under sentence four
of Section 405(g), the court may reverse or modify the
Secretary's decision and remand the matter to the Secretary
for further proceedings. A remand under sentence four of
Section 405(g) is appealable by the Secretary.
A Social Security case may also be remanded under sentence six of Section 405(g), but that occurs only when the
Secretary requests a remand before filing his or her answer,
or when the court finds there was good cause for the
claimant's failure to produce newly discovered, material evidence. The Secretary may not appeal a sentence-six remand.
The district court reviews the post-remand administrative
proceedings conducted pursuant to a sentence-six remand.
The Supreme Court has had occasion to consider three
Social Security cases since 1989 relating to the issue of attorney's fees. In Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989), the
court held that a district court has authority under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) to retain jurisdiction and enter a post-remand judgment.
In Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 (1990), the
Supreme Court identified two kinds of remands under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g): remands pursuant to the fourth sentence and
remands pursuant to the sixth sentence. The Court held that
remand under sentence four is a "final judgment" that may
be appealed by the Secretary. The Court did not consider the
specific question of whether a remand under sentence four is
a "final judgment" for purposes of triggering the time period
for applying for attorney's fees under the EAJA.
In Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 2157 (1991), the
PREVIEW

Supreme Court stated that, in cases remanded to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services pursuant to the
fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), the 30-day filing period under the EAJA "begins after the final judgment ('affirming, modifying, or reversing') is entered by the court and the
appeal period has run, so that the judgment is no longer
appealable." The Court held that the term "final judgment" in
the EAJA refers only to court orders and, therefore, decisions
of administrative agencies may not trigger the 30-day limitations period. Left unclear in Melkonyan is the question of
whether a district court must enter judgment simultaneously
with its issuance of a sentence-four remand in cases where the
claimant's entitlement to benefits has yet to be determined.
In Welter v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1991),
decided 17 days after Melkonyan, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that remands to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services pursuant to the fourth sentence
of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) were not final judgments modifying or
reversing the decisions of the Secretary within the meaning
of that sentence. Instead, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the
district court retained jurisdiction of the claimants' cases and
planned to enter dispositive judgments after the Secretary
reevaluated the claimants' applications for benefits. Because
the parties did not report to the district court after the
Secretary had awarded benefits to the claimants on remand,
the Eighth Circuit concluded that no final judgments had
been entered and the EAJA applications were timely.
The First and Tenth Circuits have rendered decisions in
agreement with the Eighth Circuit. The issue has also been
raised in cases pending in the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Luna v. Department
of Health and Human Services, 948 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1991),
held that every sentence-four remand under Section 405(g) is
a final judgment for purposes of the EAJA and that the 30day time period begins running at the point at which that final
judgment has been entered and the period for appeal has run.
It is estimated that more than 4,000 Social Security cases
were remanded by the district courts for further administrative proceedings in 1990, and that more than 2,500 were
remanded in 1991. Schaefer suggests that a decision upholding the Secretary's construction of section 405(g) obliterates
the distinction between sentence-four and sentence-six
remands, while the Secretary argues that this construction
will assure that applications for EAJA attorney's fees are
filed promptly.

Issue No. 7

ARGUMENTS
For Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human
Services (Counsel of Record, Kenneth W. Starr, Solicitor
General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530;
telephone (202) 514-2217):
1. The EAJA requires a fee application to be filed within 30
days of the "final judgment" in a civil action, which is
defined to mean a judgment that is "final and not appealable."
2. The district court's order, reversing the Secretary's decision of April 4, 1989, to deny benefits and remanding for
a rehearing, was an appealable "final judgment" that
became "not appealable" 60 days later on June 3, 1989,
when the time for taking an appeal expired.
3. A district court cannot permit circumvention of the 30day filing requirement by purporting to remand the case
under sentence four without entering a final judgment,
and instead retaining jurisdiction to enter a final judgment after proceedings on remand are completed.
4. Departure from the text of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and the
EAJA is not justified by the fact that a claimant does not
become a fully prevailing party following a sentence-four
remand unless he or she is awarded benefits on remand.
For Richard H. Schaefer (Counsel of Record, Randall J.
Fuller; Babcock, Locher, Neilson & Mannella, 118 Main
Street, Anoka, MN 55303; telephone (612) 421-5151):
1. The EAJA's limitation period can only be triggered by a
district court judgment issued after the claimant has won
his or her claim for benefits.
2. A case is not "final" for attorney's fees purposes until it
can be determined whether the claimant has prevailed,
which, in Social Security cases remanded to the Secretary
for further proceedings, does not occur until after the
results of those proceedings are known.
3. If the Supreme Court reverses the Eighth Circuit's ruling,
the decision should be applied prospectively only,
because at the time the Secretary says Schaefer should
have filed his fee application such a filing would have
been considered premature under all then-existing precedent and the Secretary's own policies.
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